

## Community resources

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## Viewing cable 09ANKARA1145, TURKEY: SWEDES VIEW INCREASING AEGEAN TENSIONS AS

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### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09ANKARA1145**.

| Reference ID                 | Created                          | Released                         | Classification               | Origin                         |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <a href="#">09ANKARA1145</a> | <a href="#">2009-08-07 11:28</a> | <a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a> | <a href="#">CONFIDENTIAL</a> | <a href="#">Embassy Ankara</a> |

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001145

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2019  
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREL](#) [EUN](#) [TU](#) [SW](#)  
SUBJECT: TURKEY: SWEDES VIEW INCREASING AEGEAN TENSIONS AS  
CONTRARY TO EU ASPIRATIONS

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 467  
[1](#)B. STATE 77681

¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador discussed reftels joint efforts with Swedish Ambassador Christer Asp August 5 and noted, in particular, that rising Turkish-Greek tensions over recent Aegean events could inadvertently impact Turkey's EU accession bid. Asp commented that Greece and Cyprus already have attempted to raise the issue in the July GAERC meeting. As EU President, Stockholm has pushed Ankara to take steps that would ease stresses with Athens and Nicosia, namely opening the Halki Seminary and backing down on objections to Cypriot oil explorations. Despite a general feeling that heavy lifting on Cyprus would have to wait until MFA U/S Apakan (a hardliner on Cyprus/Greek issues) left for his new assignment in September, Asp reported that he has already seen signs of flexibility, including some from Apakan himself. The most promising is a possible GOT declaration of non-aggression and peaceful resolution regarding the continental shelf. End Summary.

¶2. (C) In an August 5 meeting, the Ambassador reiterated to Swedish Ambassador Christer Asp that the USG intentions to work in tandem with Stockholm on issues related to Turkey's EU accession bid as earlier discussed by EUR DAS Matt Bryza and Swedish MFA Director Lars Wahlund in a July 19 DVC (ref A). The Ambassador noted a disappointing turn from warming Turkish-Greek relations punctuated by recent Turkish military flights over the Greek-populated Agathonisi and Farmakonisi islands. Such events could adversely impact the upcoming Ankara Protocol review in November should Athens decided to drag Brussels into a bilateral dispute over the Aegean.

¶3. (C) Asp commented that Brussels has traditionally chosen to "stay out" of Turkish-Greek disputes. However, given the importance of this year's Ankara Protocol review, he has articulated similar concerns to the GOT. Both Greece and Cyprus raised territorial complaints against Turkey at the July EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting, reported Asp. As EU President, Sweden managed to kill the discussion by convincing other members not to intervene. Nevertheless, Cyprus will likely revive the issue again before November. Asp agreed to echo the Ambassadors concerns over Agathonisi and Farmakonisi with the GOT.

¶4. (C) Under its EU Presidency, Stockholm has pushed Ankara to open Halki Seminary as it would gain Turkey good will with the Greek Orthodox community and benefit Istanbul as a 2010 European Capitol of Culture. Asp said that Swedish MFA U/S Frank Belfrage pushed U/S Apakan hard on this issue during an August 3 Brussels meeting. Asp had also encouraged lead GOT EU negotiator Egemen Bagis to do the same and to show more flexibility toward Cyprus. Bagis reportedly responded that he was working on Halki, but that it would ultimately require a reciprocal act in Northern Thrace. (NOTE: In contrast to a month ago, we are hearing this linkage every time Halki comes up. This is significant step backward. END NOTE) Cyprus, however, would have to wait until September, when Apakan assumes his new position as Turkish UN Permanent Representative in New York.

¶5. (C) Asp reported, however, that Apakan has show signs of softening his traditionally intransigent position on Cyprus. During his meeting with Belfrage, Apakan reportedly said that he would consider allowing Cypriots to attend one of the three OECD education and cultural programs that Turkey had previously blocked. Belfrage also encouraged Apakan to show more flexibility on energy issues, namely Cypriot oil exploration, as current Turkish objections will just prolong Nicosia's efforts to block the opening of additional EU chapters (namely energy) and to contemplate issuing a declaration of non-aggression and peaceful resolution on the matter. Asp reported he had been told since that the GOT was working on such a resolution and would consult with the Swedes regarding content and timing. (NOTE: Asp opined that the EU has shot itself in the foot over the energy chapter by allowing Nicosia to block its opening. Momentum is growing

amongst members to increase pressure on Cyprus to step down; Nabucco has helped with this. END NOTE) Nevertheless, he expressed concern to the Ambassador that the Turks may ask the GOC for a guarantee of equal rights on the continental

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shelf in return. On the Ankara Protocol, Apakan reportedly said that Turkey may consider a variation of the Finnish Proposal of opening one airport and one port in exchange for Famagusta.

¶6. (C) Comment: Asp is willing to give the Turks the benefit of the doubt on issues such as the Aegean. As we have noted previously, Athens' reluctance to explain why overflights of Agathonisi and Farmakonisi are different (i.e. real violations of sovereignty) has even the Swedes confused.

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<http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey>

JEFFREY